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Abstract: The expulsion of party members for the expression of dissent is a common practice 
in democratic states around the world, which can have momentous consequences for individual 
parties and the political system at large. In this article, we address the question of whether 
limitations on party members’ free speech can be defended on normative grounds. Drawing on 
a conception of parties that sees them as broader membership organisations that allow citizens 
to exercise political agency in a unique fashion, as well as on insights from the broader 
normative-theoretical literature on organisations, we build a strong presumptive case that 
interference with party members’ political freedoms is normatively problematic. Exploring 
numerous weighty arguments in favour of limiting freedom of speech within parties, we find 
that none of them provides a knock-down argument against our case. The argument we advance 
has important implications for contemporary theoretical debates about parties and partisanship, 
and for the regulation of parties’ internal affairs more generally. 
 




Disagreement is common within political parties. Party members routinely ‘conflict 
over the direction the party or its candidates will take in elections and in the course of 
governing’ – ‘or the proper stance in opposition’ (Rosenblum, 2008: 361). Even an 
appeal to the ‘foundational’ values of the party may prove insufficient to resolve such 
conflicts, for partisans may continue to disagree about the nature of such values and 
what they demand in practice. Intra-party conflict over these and other issues can, and 
often does, become heated. It can lead some members of the party to emphatically 
dissent from the party’s official stance, criticising the leadership for its decisions, 
perhaps even raising doubts about the leaders’ overall credibility. And sometimes those 
dissenters face severe sanctions. Indeed, the expulsion of party members for expressing 
views that party leaders deem objectionable is far from uncommon in democratic 
systems around the world.  
Consider the case of Suheyl Batum, who was a member of Turkey’s leading 
opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Batum belonged to a group of 
backbenchers, who were critical of their party’s attempt to attract conservative 
religious voters, instead espousing a return to Turkey’s secular and nationalist outlook. 
In 2014, he criticised the party leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, asking for him to step down 
in the aftermath of the latter’s poor performance in the national presidential elections. 
He was eventually expelled by the CHP for ‘acting in a manner damaging to the party's 
integrity’ (Anadolou Agency, 2014). Or consider Gufran-e-Azam, who was a member 
of the Congress Party, the leading opposition party in India. In 2014, he criticised the 
party president, Sonia Gandhi, and her son the party’s Vice-President, Rahul Gandhi, 
for their poor performance in the recently-held general elections. The Congress had 
dropped to its poorest ever tally of seats in parliament in the face of a convincing 
victory by Narender Modi. Azam was expelled for ‘indulging in anti-party activities 
and making unnecessary statements against the party leadership’ (Economic Times, 
2014). Or consider that in 2019, a former advisor to Prime Minister Tony Blair was 
expelled by the Labour Party after he publicly declared on Twitter that he had cast his 
vote for the Liberal Democrats in elections to the European Parliament. Justifying its 
decision, Labour stated that ‘publicly declaring or encouraging support for another 
candidate or party is against the rules and is incompatible with party membership’ 
(BBC, 2019). 
To cite an even more recent example, in October 2020, Jeremy Corbyn was 
suspended from the UK Labour Party, which he had led until only six months ago. The 
suspension was a result of his comments on a report on antisemitism in the party under 
his leadership, which Corbyn insisted, had been dramatically overstated for political 
reasons. The suspension was lifted after three weeks, following an internal disciplinary 
 3 
process, although Corbyn continued to find himself excluded from the party’s 
legislative caucus. In the period between his suspension and reinstatement, the party 
was threatened by what commentators described as a potential ‘civil war’, with Corbyn 
raising funds for a legal challenge, and some of his followers resigning from Labour in 
protest. In the end, the episode marked, according to some commentators, the 
seemingly definitive end of one of the more spectacular recent attempts to change the 
Labour party and its ideology from within. In the context of Corbyn’s suspension, the 
 
Corbynistas have been cleared from the shadow cabinet, and now loiter on the 
backbenches, unhappy at the direction of travel. Veterans of Labour’s last spell in 
office, a decade ago, would like a fight: better a cleansing clear-out than squalid unity. 
Nor is it apparent that the membership who once chanted Mr Corbyn’s name will put 
up much of a fight (The Economist, 2020). 
 
While the consequences of this particular incident for the Labour party are 
certainly debateable, there are cases where similar circumstances have had clear 
ramifications for a political party and the political system at large. Take, for example, 
the 1987 expulsion of Vishwanath Pratap Singh from the Indian National Congress by 
then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. Gandhi justified the move by citing an interview 
that Singh – a major rival within the party – had given to a newspaper, which included 
adverse comments about corruption in his government (LA Times, 1987). Singh would 
later form a new party and return as Prime Minister two years after his expulsion from 
the Congress party. Although Singh’s government was short-lived, the party he 
founded after his expulsion went on to become a major force in national and regional 
politics in the years to come.  
 Whatever the particular consequences of suspending or expelling party 
members for their speech acts, a more fundamental question concerns the permissibility 
of limiting party members’ freedom of speech. To be sure, party constitutions generally 
prescribe procedures that must be followed in disciplining members in disputes like the 
kind this article addresses. But the principles that ought to regulate such procedures 
remain in need of clarification.1 In other words, the problem of free speech in the party 
is not just one of a fair procedure for arbitrating disputes. Rather, it consists in 
identifying the normative concerns that should affect how parties respond to disputes 
                                                 
1 Vagueness about the limits of permissible speech can co-exist alongside the juridification of party 
constitutions, where detailed rules are put in place for the impartial regulation of intra-party disputes. 
Consider, for instance, the Green Party and the Labour Party in the UK – both parties’ constitutions have 
been shown to have high levels of juridification (Bolleyer et al. 2020: 127). The Green Party Constitution 
permits the expulsion of members when it ‘is in the Party's interest to do so’ (Article 4(vii)). Similarly, 
the Labour Party requires, as a condition of retaining membership, an individual to ‘accept and conform 
to the constitution, programme, principles and policy of the Party’ (Chapter 2 Clause I Article 6A). 
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generated by their members’ exercise of speech. So, should party members really have 
to mind their speech, or failing that, face disciplinary action from their organisation?  
Arguably, many will find the sanctioning of party members for, say, openly 
criticising the party leadership democratically suspect, in part because parties are often 
evaluated according to the same democratic standards that govern society at large, 
where free speech typically enjoys constitutional protection as valuable political 
liberty. But there are also serious objections to free speech within the party, to do with 
the party’s nature as a competitive association whose ability to contest elections may 
be undermined by internal dissent, and indeed party members’ freedom to exit the party 
(and join another one) in response to internal speech-regimes. Taking these 
considerations seriously, we want in this article to systematically discuss the problem 
of freedom of speech within the party, clarifying why and when it is problematic to 
limit party members’ free speech. We develop our argument on the basis of a normative 
understanding of parties that sees them as broader membership organisations (rather 
than teams of political elites) that allow citizens to exercise political agency in ways 
that no other form of political organisation can, as well as insights from the theoretical 
literature on organisations (esp. Anderson, 2017; Herzog, 2018). 
 Our main focus in the article is on limitations on freedom of speech (because it 
is a central political liberty without which the exercise of political agency would be 
severely impaired) and expulsion from the party (because it is arguably the harshest 
form of disciplinary action available), but our argument has the potential to travel 
further inasmuch as we mount a broader defence of party members’ moral agency 
according to which there is a presumptive case that any interference with their political 
freedoms is problematic. We will also bracket the issue of when criticism expressed by 
party members may be morally objectionable because of its particular substantive 
content (e.g. because it qualifies as ‘hate speech’). This is not because the issue is 
unimportant, but because arguments for why certain forms of speech are morally 
impermissible are independent from the arguments that we advance. Moreover, while 
we pay heed to the fact that party members may be committed to the party in very 
different ways, we set aside the role obligations that holders of specific posts (e.g. a 
party spokesperson) might bear. Suffice it to say that our argument is compatible with 
the notion that, even if party members should normally enjoy freedom of speech, 
certain role-bearers should be subject to greater constraints. 
 Our aim in this article is to highlight the dimensions relevant in evaluating how 
claims for freedom of speech within the party should be treated. We do not attempt to 
offer a bright line or threshold that delineates the precise scope of permissible speech 
within parties. Rather, we seek to shed light, first, on the importance of freedom of 
speech within the party, and second, the kind of contextual factors that bear 
consideration in assessing intra-party disputes. In doing so, we aim to contribute both 
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to a wider normative debate about parties and partisanship (e.g. Bonotti, 2017; White 
and Ypi, 2016; Wolkenstein, 2019), and a more specific debate on the regulation of 
parties’ internal affairs. 
The latter debate is frequently tied to the relationship between political parties 
and the state. For the most part, common law has treated parties as purely private 
institutions, outside the domain of public law (see Orr 2014 for an overview of this 
position). On this account, parties are ‘assemblages of persons gathered together to 
advance their political interests […] governed by the law of contract’ (Morris, 2012: 
107), which in turn places sharp limits on the degree to which public law standards 
may be applied to parties’ internal affairs. Since parties are self-governing private 
bodies, they ought to be free to conduct their affairs as they see fit (Brody, 2002; 
Rosenblum, 2000). Yet, the ever-growing proximity between parties and the state in 
many established democracies has led many to argue that they are better characterised 
as quasi-public entities (Gauja, 2010: 92-94; van Biezen, 2004: 701-722; also see Katz 
and Mair, 2009). Indeed, rather than being mere creatures of contract, parties are now 
increasingly embedded in national constitutions or legislation around the democratic 
process (for an overview of these trends, see van Biezen, 2012). In many jurisdictions, 
they also enjoy privileges like access to state funding. As such, goes the argument, 
parties may legitimately be required to comply with public law standards, such as non-
discrimination laws or requirements of procedural fairness in their disciplinary 
procedures (a classic defence of this claim is Kelsen, 1929 [2013]). 
While our argument is predicated on the idea that, in most jurisdictions, it is 
more plausible to treat parties as quasi-public entities, and thus require them to comply 
with public law standards, the below analysis also suggests that the party-state 
relationship constitutes merely one dimension that bears on the issue of parties’ 
handling of internal dissent. More particularly, settling how parties should respond to 
dissent within their ranks requires us to ask not only how parties relate to the state, but 
also offer an account of their relationship with the wider party system, the nature of 
their relationship with the party member in question, and where a party stands in the 
life cycle of the electoral process at a given moment. No doubt, this list is far from 
exhaustive. But we hope that this article contributes towards reorienting and expanding 
the debate over parties’ internal affairs, by calling attention to the multiplicity of 




What is a party? 
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We begin by outlining the normative conception of party that we employ in this article. 
This is predicated on the empirical observation that parties are complex membership 
organisations consisting of party elites and officials, a diverse administrative staff, as 
well as ‘ordinary’ members and activists (there is an extensive political science 
literature that uses this understanding of party, key recent contributions are Ignazi, 
2017; Katz and Mair, 2009; Mair, 2013; Scarrow, 2014). Empirical scholars using this 
conception of party routinely draw attention to the fact that actors other than party elites 
– most notably party members and activists – often play an important role in parties 
(e.g. mobilising voters, deciding on candidates or policy, etc.), though they are 
naturally careful about drawing normative conclusions from this observation (Hazan 
and Rahat, 2010; Scarrow, 2014). Our own understanding of party does not specify 
specific roles for specific actors within the party, but assumes that the agency of those 
who engage in parties ought to be protected.  
 Before further explicating what we mean by that, it is worth noting that this 
view of party is far from unfamiliar. It figures both in classical (e.g. Gramsci, 1929-
1935 [1971]; Kelsen, 1929 [2013]; Michels, 1911 [1989]) and contemporary (e.g. Biale 
and Ottonelli, 2019; Ebeling and Wolkenstein, 2018; White and Ypi, 2016; 
Wolkenstein, 2018; Wolkenstein, 2019) theoretical scholarship on parties, and its 
proponents typically argue that parties should be organised in an internally democratic 
fashion. Some scholars belonging in this tradition, such as the famous constitutional 
theorist Hans Kelsen, even suggested that parties should be subject to constitutional 
regulation so as to guarantee individual members (esp. MPs) a ‘degree of democratic 
self-determination’ vis-à-vis party leaders (Kelsen, 1929 [2013]: 41). In this way, the 
agency of party members should be protected. 
 This image of party marks itself off from another popular normative 
understanding of party, one that sees them as leader-centred teams of politicians that 
are rationally motivated to win office. Wedded to a minimalist conception of 
democracy as ‘competition for [political] leadership’ (Schumpeter, 1942 [2008]: 271; 
Downs, 1957), this view is often simply assumed to be the correct view of party in 
political science scholarship (on this point, see White and Ypi, 2016: 9-14). Accounts 
that argumentatively defend it (typically against versions of the view of party that we 
endorse) tend to highlight the destabilising consequences of internal party democracy, 
conjuring up the risk of activist capture – parties being controlled by radical minorities 
whose preferences and values are out of sync with those of the voters – and internal 
conflict that makes parties unresponsive or produce bad policy (e.g. Rosenbluth and 
Shapiro, 2018; Manow, 2020). The fear is that protecting (or promoting) the agency of 
party members, to use the language we introduced above, will have high costs for 
parties and democracy at large. 
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 A major problem with most defences of this ‘minimalist’ view of party is that 
they tend to operate with a specific political system, or perhaps more accurately: an 
idealised image of that system, in mind. More particularly, both recent (e.g. Rosenbluth 
and Shapiro, 2018) and classic (e.g. Schumpeter, 1942 [2008]) accounts treat the mid-
twentieth century British Westminster system as ideal embodiment of well-functioning 
party democracy. This strategy of theory-building overlooks that the ostensible risks of 
empowering party members are not equally great across political systems; under 
proportional representation, for example, individual parties are under less pressure to 
be responsive to society as a whole than in the majoritarian Westminster system (they 
form big-tent coalitions to speak to a broader set of voters) (Wolkenstein, forthcoming). 
Hand in hand with this idealised image of a particular political system comes a heavily 
idealised understanding of party competition, according to which the decentralisation 
of power within parties, say through more inclusive and democratic decision-making 
procedures, undermines their capacity to provide voters with meaningful policy 
alternatives. This view of party competition overlooks that, at least according to one 
influential empirical literature, parties’ growing tendency to ‘limit the degree to which 
they “out-bid” one another’ is not a function of increased internal democratisation but 
the collusive behaviour of elites from multiple parties (Katz and Mair, 2009: 758; 
Ignazi, 2017; Mair, 2013). 
This leads to another problem that plagues defences of the ‘minimalist’ view of 
parties: they often exaggerate the extent to which parties in established democracy are 
actually internally democratic, foregrounding individual examples of internal 
democratisation that in the view of the authors had adverse effects for the party in 
question (both Rosenbluth and Shapiro, 2018 and Manow, 2020 mention the election 
of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour party as paradigmatic case) whilst turning a 
blind eye to a great deal of evidence that suggests that most parties are still very much 
controlled by small groups of elites (see, e.g., the comprehensive volume Cross and 
Katz, 2013 and Ignazi, 2017). Yet, perhaps parties struggle to appeal to voters for other 
reasons than ‘decentralizing democratic reforms’ (Rosenbluth and Shapiro, 2018: 2). 
Alternative explanations are certainly available, ranging from political elites’ 
acceptance of a neoliberal politics of necessity (e.g. Mair, 2013; Mudge, 2018) to a 
weakening of traditional partisan identities due to widespread ‘cognitive mobilisation’ 
(e.g. Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolkenstein, 2017) – but these are rarely systematically 
considered by defenders of the minimalist view of parties. 
Finally, the normative account of parties that sees them as hierarchically 
organised teams of professional politicians that act on the basis of self-interest is 
insensitive to the fact that parties de facto consist of members and activists too, as the 
above-mentioned empirical research on party highlight – and that it is reasonable for 
those individuals to associate with parties (White and Ypi, 2016: 13-14). The 
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minimalist view cannot explain this and thereby fails to take seriously the perspective 
of a great number of people who identify with parties and for whom associating with a 
party makes sense for reasons that cannot be reduced to electoral self-interest. The more 
comprehensive conception of party that we endorse can explain this, in addition to 
explaining why party members’ agency is worthy of protection. It thus can offer a more 
accurate normative account of party that is sensitive to the perspective of those who 




Moral Agency and the Party 
 
With these preliminary arguments for our normative account of party in place, we can 
now proceed to the more detailed normative argument for protecting party members’ 
agency. This forms the backbone of the remainder of the article. The first thing that 
needs to be unpacked is the category of party membership itself. While party 
membership is not a monolithic category (for a cutting-edge overview, see Scarrow, 
2014), for our purposes it suffices to distinguish between (1) party members who have 
joined the party in order to influence political decisions, for instance by joining a local 
party branch or trying to run for offices within the party (call them activists) and (2) 
party members who have joined the party for other reasons and expect other kinds of 
benefits from their membership (call them the loyalists).2 
This is a stylised distinction, and one can certainly be both activist and loyalist 
at the same time. But, as conceptual research that differentiates between the social and 
political benefits of party membership highlights, it makes good sense to separate these 
two kinds of party membership analytically (Scarrow, 2014: chs. 7 and 8). 
Accordingly, party members that we classify as activists are driven by ‘selective’ 
                                                 
2 A separate question concerns the normative grounds for including these different types of party 
members in intra-party democratic procedures. That is, it might reasonably be asked whether every party 
member has an equally strong claim to be included in internal democratic procedures, or whether party 
members needs to fulfil specific criteria – say, having been an active member for a particular time – to 
be included (or indeed whether there is a case for including even non-members; for discussion of this 
challenging issue, see Wolkenstein, 2018: 445-449)? While we acknowledge that different principled 
arguments for more or less inclusion are thinkable, for our purposes, we do not have to take a firm 
position on this. In line with the conception of party that our argument is predicated on, we discuss the 
implications of our argument for several different member-types that are typically found within parties, 
without making any further proposition to the effect that some of them deserve to be heard more or less 
than others. Of course, our presumptive case for respecting party members’ agency seems to imply that 
we think that any party member has an equal claim to inclusion. But note that our view is compatible 
with the possibility of party members democratically deciding to limit the inclusiveness of internal 
deliberations (or decision procedures); so, we have no principled opposition to limiting inclusiveness. 
We thank one anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
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(obtaining political information and exercising influence) and ‘exclusive’ (office-
holding) political benefits, while loyalists are those whose main motivation to engage 
in a party are ‘collective’ (affirming and sustaining a sense of identity and community) 
and ‘selective’ (finding friends and raising one’s social status) social benefits. While 
the problem of freedom of speech and its regulation concerns first and foremost party 
elites (meaning elected MPs and officials, cf. the cases mentioned in the introduction), 
and activists, the arguments we develop also have implications for loyalists. 
Party elites and activists typically take an active interest in shaping the political 
decisions that are made within the party. To that effect, they seek to exercise agency 
within the party, and it is our argument that such agency should be a matter of moral 
concern and deserves protection. To understand this, it is useful to first remind 
ourselves what the nature of the agency at stake is. Some might be inclined to think 
that individual agency tends to be undermined by participation in collective structures: 
to submit oneself to the decisions of a collective organisation, they might say, is to 
trade one’s individual autonomy for the pursuit of shared goals. But though exercising 
agency qua member of a group differs from doing so as an individual, there can be no 
doubt that one can also meaningfully be an agent within a group. Kutz (2000: 105-106) 
helpfully distinguishes here between exclusive and inclusive authorship: 
  
I am the exclusive author of the actions I perform myself, as well as of the events 
caused by those actions. My authorship is exclusive because I and only I can say of an 
action or event ‘I did it’, or ‘I caused it to be done’. By contrast, I am an inclusive 
author of the actions of the group in which I participate, inclusive because I am one 
among those who can say ‘We did it’. 
  
The agency of active party members is best conceived in terms of inclusive authorship. 
An important component of inclusive authorship that must be further unpacked 
is the notion of ‘participation’. In general, we suggest, the most appropriate way of 
thinking about ‘participation’ is to conceive it as an individual party member’s ability 
to ensure fair consideration of her preferred course of action. This requires more than 
mere inclusion in the decision-making process (it does not suffice merely to have a 
formal right to vote on, say, a party manifesto), but less than actual influence on the 
outcome (one need not, say, have personally decided the formulations of the key 
passages of the manifesto). It requires that party members can secure uptake of their 
views, without having to have the final word on each decision (see Moore and 
O’Doherty, 2014). This conception of participation allows members to exercise agency 
in a way consistent with respect for others’ agency, such that they can refer to their 
joint decisions as something ‘we’ did. 
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To see why it is a matter of moral concern that active party members can 
exercise agency in this way, consider first that parties are organisations that are based 
on a division of labour between different kinds of party members who contribute on 
multiple fronts (acting as one among its public faces, mobilising on the party’s behalf, 
and so on). Because of this, no single party member is the exclusive author of the 
party’s actions: each members’ actions are elements of larger processes. This implies 
that party members have limited knowledge about morally relevant aspects of their 
work. ‘Responsibility is divided, and … there are often gaps or ambiguities in the 
division of responsibility, so that no one feels responsible for the outcome … As a 
consequence, moral wrongs can happen without anyone intending them, and without 
anyone feeling an immediate responsibility for them’ (Herzog, 2018: 71). This point 
applies to complex organisations more generally, and we argue that it is true for parties 
as well. In fact, one of the great dangers of organising parties in a way that leaves no 
space for their members’ exercise of agency and decouples them from the 
consequences of their actions is that ‘one can make them complicit in wrong-doing 
much more easily than if they had to face the consequences of their actions directly’ 
(ibid.). 
To better understand this point, imagine a group of party activists who seek to 
convince fellow citizens to vote for their party. The activists spend long days 
canvassing in their local community, going from door to door and telling people about 
the party’s new manifesto and the many desirable aims formulate in it. Yet the activists 
themselves had no influence on the creation of the manifesto: they were not asked to 
contribute to it, nor did they have the opportunity to object to or revise any of the 
proposals it contains. In short, the activists were barred from participating in the 
process in which the manifesto whose realisation they want to secure was discussed, 
framed and written. This, we suggest, eventually places serious limits on their capacity 
to act as morally responsible agents and subject the potential or actual consequences of 
their contributions to sustained reflection. 
Normative scholarship on organisations draws attention to two further ways in 
which the absence of opportunities to participate in the decisions of the party may pose 
a threat to active party members’ moral agency (Herzog, 2018: 176-182). The first is 
complete identification, which occurs when party members uncritically buy into the 
norms and obligations that others have defined for their role in the party. It is not 
difficult to interpret some cases of partisan polarisation along these lines, where party 
members intransigently hold on to their own normative commitments and ignore valid 
concerns raised by opponents (within and without the party). The second threat to moral 
agency is disengagement, where party members gradually become alienated from the 
party and begin to see their roles in the party merely as ‘coats’ they don temporarily, 
to be shed once they retreat into the private realm of their ‘real’ lives – think for 
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example of party officials who have served the party over many years in administrative 
and coordinative tasks, without gaining any influence on the decisions the 
implementation of which they were meant to oversee. Both of these attitudes pose 
dangers to party members’ moral agency because they risk making them mere 
instruments for the realisation of aims determined by others. This is antithetical to the 
idea of relating to one’s actions as a responsible agent rather than one who is merely 




Agency, deliberation and free speech 
 
Having established why the agency of active party members deserves moral concern, 
we move now to the more specific question of what is the link between the exercise of 
agency by party members and intra-party dissent. One possible conclusion readers 
might draw from the above considerations is that, insofar as parties’ internal democratic 
processes adequately accommodate members’ concerns – say by establishing effective 
internal deliberative forums that grant members a degree of what Biale and Ottonelli 
(2019) call ‘reflexive control’ over the party’s decisions (on this, also see Wolkenstein, 
2019) – party members’ have no claim to voice dissent and their freedom of speech 
may permissibly be restricted by the party leadership. For when members’ opinions 
have received fair consideration, their exercise of agency within the party has been 
protected, and protected in a way compatible with respect for their co-partisans’ 
agency. 
But this conclusion is spurious. It would make little sense to say, on the one 
hand, that party members’ agency deserves moral concern, and on the other hand accept 
that their free speech may be limited so long as parties allow for the fair consideration 
of members’ views in the making of internal decisions. It would make little sense 
because if it is valuable that party members take responsibility for the party’s actions, 
as we suggest it is, then they must also be permitted to criticise those actions after they 
were taken, rather than being sanctioned for acting as responsible agents who 
continually reflect on their actions’ possible or actual consequences and perhaps even 
come to question the decision they contributed to. Indeed, from the point of view of 
party members’ agency, the outcome of an (however fair) intra-party decision-making 
procedure can never be treated as a kind of ‘closure’ that ends the debate. For, as 
deliberative democratic theorists remind us, ‘every democratic decision, even if it takes 
all existing preferences into account, creates itself a new historical reality which elicits 
new reactions and new preferences which can be used to question, again, in a never-
ending process, the previous decision’ (Rummens, 2012: 28). 
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There is indeed an internal connection between freedom of speech and free 
deliberation within parties that this latter point underlines. As with citizens’ 
deliberations in the public sphere, it is precisely for reasons of respect for the agency 
of party members that deliberation should not be subject to constraints, which in turn 
means that they should be ‘free to express their beliefs and values’ even after 
preliminary decisions have been made and votes were taken (Rostbøll, 2011: 7). 
Limiting free speech within parties thus implies limiting deliberation. Note also that 
sanctions on free speech need not be implemented in order to be effective. As 
scholarship on freedom of speech reminds us, the very threat of sanctions, even when 
these remain unused, can deter individuals from saying things that they fear could 
attract penalty – this is typically called the ‘chilling effect’ (for a recent overview 
treatment, see Townend, 2017). This holds true not only of potential sanctions from the 
state, but also from leaders in other kinds of organisations, such as business firms (see 
Anderson, 2017: esp. 39-40; Herzog, 2018: 204-205), and indeed, political parties.3 
All of this, we think, makes for a strong presumptive case for why active party 
members’ freedom of speech deserves greater concern, and hence protection, than 
might at first appear. We need not at this point go into the more detailed questions of 
whether free speech protection should be absolute, or whether there are particular 
thresholds for when speech should be regulated or not regulated. It is anyways difficult 
to see how these issues could satisfyingly be settled by a generalised theoretical 
argument about free speech within parties; proposing bright-line thresholds of 
(im)permissible speech in the name of argumentative precision holds the risk of 
decoupling theoretical reasoning too much from concrete political contexts. It can also 
sometimes be difficult to determine whether a party member exercises free speech to 
voice constructive criticism or just deliberately wants to act against the party line. We 
acknowledge that there are clear-cut cases where party members simply want to 
delegitimise the status quo, and the argument of this article does not extend to these 
sorts of actions, regardless of whether or not there may be additional reasons for 
protecting them from sanctions.4 So, for now, we will simply state that all party 
members should have the freedom to speak up when they have concerns, without 
fearing sanctions. In the remainder of the article, we discuss a number of arguments 
                                                 
3 To be sure, it is highly doubtful that real-world parties even roughly approximate the ideal of granting 
members fair consideration of their views and concerns. But the argument from moral responsibility 
applies independently of whether parties de facto provide fair and inclusive intra-party decision 
procedures, or are organised in an elite-centred, top-down fashion; if anything, it provides a reason not 
to organise parties in an elite-centred, top-down fashion. 
4 We thank one anonymous reviewer for raising this point. Alastair Campbell’s case, as discussed above, 
offers an example where the distinction between ‘exercising free speech’ and ‘acting against the party 
line’ is hard to draw. Campbell’s tweet might be read as voicing criticism about the Labour party’s 
failure to stand by its core values, but it may also be interpreted as an act of sabotage against the party’s 
electoral interests. 
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that pull in the other direction, suggesting that freedom of speech within parties may 
permissibly be limited. 
Before proceeding to these arguments, a brief clarification is in order. Some 
might wonder whether there is any noteworthy relationship between dissent as exercise 
of moral agency and publicness. In short, does it matter whether dissent is voiced 
publicly or not? As the examples cited in the introduction indicate, in practice 
publicness is often necessary in order for dissent to receive uptake, since many parties 
do not provide members with appropriate means to exercise voice internally. To 
suggest that party members – elites and ‘ordinary’ members alike – could simply settle 
their conflicts and disagreements behind closed doors, in intra-party decision-making 
procedures, would seem to presuppose a rather idealised image of internal party 
democracy. As many have noted, in reality internal decision-making procedures tend 
to be dominated by a few powerful party elites that seek to systematically ‘drown out’ 
any dissenting opinions (Katz and Mair, 2009: 759; Invernizzi-Accetti and 
Wolkenstein, 2017: 102-103). Notice furthermore that parties are typically territorially 
extended entities, where local or regional members can only win the attention of the 
national leadership by expressing critique in the public sphere. The party’s membership 
base is typically dispersed across the country. To exercise agency within the party, in 
such circumstances, is to speak to one’s fellow party members, and to persuade them 
about one’s assessment of the leadership’s actions or policy positions. Such dialogue 
cannot be restricted to narrow intra-party forums which preclude attempts to engage 
with the wider membership base, and through them, with the party’s leadership. It has 
to be public. 
 
 
The exit rights argument 
 
One powerful argument against protecting party members’ freedom of speech turns 
upon the voluntarist nature of the party. It holds that party members’ freedom of speech 
may permissibly be restricted because they are free to exit any party that is unwilling 
to accommodate their views, and join another party (or even found a new one). Not 
only have they, by joining a specific party, willingly entered an organisation that might 
not always be able to accommodate their views. Because they can always leave the 
party, they are not ‘coerced into silence’ either. Rather, they remain free to exercise 
their deliberative agency as described, just not within one particular party. Note that 
arguments of this sort have been advanced in discussions around ‘workplace 
constitutionalism’, in connection with the rights of employers to limit employees’ 





Harming party members’ political rights? 
 
A first reply to this argument is that restrictions on party members’ freedom of speech 
cannot be defended on the grounds that party members are free to exit the party, since 
the costs of losing the specific political rights that come with being a party member can 
be unduly burdensome. This concern would seem to apply to party elites as well as 
activists, whose participation in the party is closely bound up with the exercise of 
political rights. It does not apply to party loyalists, who, as noted, join the party for 
other reasons than exerting influence on political decisions. For those we class as party 
elites, losing political rights would in many cases go hand in hand with losing 
employment, since it is their job to exercise political rights within a particular party. 
Of course, some of them will be sufficiently well-off not to suffer economically from 
the loss of employment, and they will likely quickly find new employment (e.g. in 
advisory jobs or lobbying). But there is nonetheless a serious impact on an individual’s 
life-plans involved in losing one’s job. 
Activists, whose loss of political rights within a particular party would typically 
not involve losing their employment, would at first seem to be less impacted in terms 
of their life-plans. But one must be careful with granting economic rights relative 
priority over political rights. The question, we think, is not whether losing one’s job or 
‘just’ one’s ability to actively engage in and on behalf of a specific party has greater 
immediate impact on individuals, but whether the pursuit of our respective rights is 
harmed. If the claim is that having to withdraw from one’s party can harm the pursuit 
of political rights, then the absence of immediate, wide-ranging (economic) impact on 
an individual’s life is not a counter-argument we can admit.  
A sceptic might counter that membership of a political parties is not necessary 
for the enjoyment of political rights to begin with. Innumerable scholars have 
emphasised the growing importance of less or non-institutionalised ways of exercising 
political rights, notably through social movements that are rooted in civil society. For 
many, social movements perform largely the same function as parties, and they tend to 
be more attractive to citizens at that (e.g. Tilly and Tarrow, 2007; for discussion and 
critique, see Dean, 2016). So, political rights can certainly be enjoyed and exercised in 
other ways than through party membership. Yet, given that virtually all democratic 
states organise democratic decision-making around elections and parliaments, which 
in turn are organised by parties, partisan affiliation seems to remain the most viable 
route for ordinary citizens to meaningfully exercise their political rights so as to be 
heard in the polity’s decision-making process. Those left outside political party 
competition are considerably less likely to contribute to how decisions are made, even 
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when these decisions affect them in significant ways (for a classic defence of this point, 
see Kelsen, 1929 [2013]: 39). 
Of course, none of this is to say that those who do not join a political party have 
no influence at all. Indeed, activists who engage in social movements, in street-level 
protest or actions of civil disobedience, can achieve considerable impact on political 
decisions. But it remains the case that they depend to a large degree on being heard by 
those partisan actors who are ultimately responsible for translating collectively formed 
wills into binding decisions through the relevant legislative channels; the ‘most they 
will be able to project therefore is the capacity to influence the governmental agenda – 
not the capacity to design it and execute it independently’ as parties do (White and Ypi, 
2010: 818; Dean, 2016). Notice furthermore that, depending on the regulatory context 
in one’s jurisdiction, there can be significant barriers, especially in raising finances, for 
entry for those who wish to run as independent candidates or start their own party. 
Nor are we suggesting that any party is fit to enable the effective exercise of 
political rights. The widely-debated literature on the ‘cartelisation’ of parties suggests 
in fact that many parties are organised in such a way as to minimise the influence of 
their members and maximise party elite’s control over the agenda (Katz and Mair, 
2009; Mair, 2013). Yet countervailing tendencies are also observable, with parties 
trying to increase the impact of their members and multiply the ways in which they can 
exercise voice (Gauja, 2015; Scarrow, 2014). At any rate, we think that there are good 
reasons to think that affiliation in a party is an important way of enacting political 
rights. 
To be sure, it is necessary to distinguish between (1) membership of a party and 
(2) membership of a particular party. This distinction is important because it might be 
said that everything that has been said up until this point implies only that the effective 
exercise of political rights requires membership of a political party; it does not follow 
that membership of a particular – one’s current – political party is necessary for that 
purpose. Opinions that are heretical in one party may in fact be very welcome in other 
parties, perhaps even central to their platform. So, dissenters within a party are likely 
to have meaningful alternatives available. 
That said, one must be cautious with overstating the number of meaningful 
alternatives. Much depends on the number and kinds of parties that are available, which 
is mainly a consequence of a country’s electoral system (Rosenbluth and Shapiro, 
2018). In some countries – usually those with First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral 
systems – there are only two parties that alternate in power. These typically represent 
quite different values and visions for society, and so joining the other party will hardly 
be an attractive option for a dissenting party member (unless, perhaps, she joins the 
other party just to make a point, emphasising that she has turned the humiliation of not 
being allowed to voice her view within her old party into newly-found confidence the 
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old party’s arch-rival). In other countries – usually those with Proportional 
Representation (PR) electoral systems and low electoral thresholds – a greater palette 
of parties might be available. Thus, party members may be able to exit their party and 
join an alternative party organisation in order to exercise agency. But note that one 
must be cautious with equating the presence of multiple parties with the presence of 
multiple meaningful alternatives to exercise agency. For the presence of multiple 
parties only facilitates agency so long as it translates into a wider range of substantive 
political options: as noted above, there is an extensive political science literature that 
shows that parties in PR systems sometimes try to out-bid each other and limit 
competition over issues (Katz and Mair, 2009; Ignazi, 2017; Mair, 2013). 
But what of founding a new party? On the face of it, this might seem like an 
effective general alternative that enables party members to exercise political rights 
without having to mind their speech. Yet again, limitations apply. And again, this has 
much to do with electoral systems. However easy it might be to found a new party in 
FPTP systems, the chances of new parties to gain parliamentary representation (let 
alone govern) are notoriously small in those systems. But even under PR, it is not easy 
for new parties establish themselves electorally, unless the effective electoral threshold 
is close to nil, as in Israel or the Netherlands. Features other than the electoral system, 
moreover, bear on the flexibility of a party system and the viability of new parties. 
Polarisation, for instance, can sharply raise the costs of defecting from one’s preferred 
party, and tends to entrench the existing party system (Goff and Lee, 2019). Similarly, 
where wealth and social status are narrowly distributed across existing political elites, 
it is much harder for outsiders to consolidate the economic capacity and social power 
base needed to challenge the existing order (North et al., 2009). Often, therefore, the 
costs of founding a new party will far exceed the benefits, rendering this an unviable 
option. However, this is not to say that founding a new party can never be a fruitful 
way forward for dissenting party members. It is simply to say that one must be very 
careful with presenting the existence of this option as a knock-down argument in favour 




Harming party members’ identity? 
 
In light of all this, we suggest that nothing conclusive follows from discussing these 
arguments with respect to the permissibility of restricting party members’ freedom of 
speech. Yet, another argument is available. This holds that involuntarily losing one’s 
membership of a party adversely impacts individuals’ social status and self-esteem, 
turning on a close connection between political affiliation, social standing, and 
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evaluations about self-worth. Accordingly, party members suffer personal harm from 
exercising exit-rights, in that their broader identity and self-understanding is 
compromised. 
Now, it is certainly not unreasonable to assume that, for some party members, 
partisan affiliation is a constitutive element of their identity. As the political science 
literature acknowledges, this is undoubtedly the case for loyalists who join parties to 
affirm and deepen their sense of belonging to a particular partisan community. But the 
same may be true for activists and party elites who joined their party in order to shape 
collective political decisions in accordance with shared principles and aims (White and 
Ypi, 2016). Indeed, many activists and elites invest their personal identity with the 
party label and view their fate as closely connected with their party’s. As former UK 
Labour MP Ian Austin stated, as he resigned from the party, ‘The Labour Party has 
been my life, so this has been the hardest decision I have ever had to take’ (Reuters, 
2019). Statements like these emphasise that decisions to leave a party are not taken 
lightly, for party members’ personal identity is often closely entwined with their 
political affiliation; thus, we should be wary of imposing on them the choice between 
free expression of their opinions and exit. 
Some might object that the cultivation of such ‘identitarian’ dispositions is not 
obligatory on behalf of party members (an argument inspired by the Schumpeterian 
‘minimalist’ view that party membership is purely instrumental to asserting material 
interests, a view we rejected in the first section). However, drawing attention to this 
fact does little to chip away at the claim about the importance of identity and self-
esteem in connection with party membership. Nor would it suffice to point out that not 
all members adopt an attitude of the kind outlined above towards their respective 
parties – think, for example, of passive members who joined a long time ago and are 
now alienated from their party. These responses are insufficient because for many party 
members, membership is, after all, a matter of deeply-held commitment, closely tied 
to their self-worth; and for those members at least, the exercise of exit-rights is a very 
burdensome option. 
This burden does not, by itself, ground a claim to freedom of speech within the 
party. As we have argued, the grounds for speech are afforded by the significance that 
exercise of moral agency within the party bears. Our point, rather, is that, in evaluating 
whether or not some members can genuinely exercise – or be expected to exercise – 
exit rights, the burdens this option imposes deserve attention. If, as is the case with 
some members, the relation between them and their party runs sufficiently deep, exit 
may be so burdensome so as to render their exclusion from the party a disproportionate 
response. In such cases, affording due recognition to the nature of members’ 
relationship with their parties and the significance it bears for them affects how the 
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proportionality of expulsion (or exit) is weighed (for more on proportionality and 
speech, Billingham and Parr, 2020: 378-83).5  
 
 
Additional non-material costs? 
 
The final argument against the exit-rights argument is that, for many who engage in 
parties, leaving the party would be an extremely hard decision because of further non-
material costs this would entail. One might argue that such costs are relatively unique 
to the particular party they support. While it is certainly true that most members of 
contemporary parties do not normally spend their lives attending party forums, making 
friends, or developing relationships, for some, paradigmatically for those we call 
loyalists, the relationships they develop through long-standing partisan affiliation are 
an important part of their lives. Perhaps these relationships are even the primary reason 
why they still engage in the party. Many such individuals may have spent longer time 
supporting, campaigning, or working for a party than most individuals have spent at 
their present place of work. It is not unreasonable to imagine, then, that their social 
lives may have become closely linked with their partisan affiliation. Of course, party 
activists and elites may equally develop such forms of attachment to the party. A former 
Labour Foreign Secretary stated while resigning from the party, that ‘The Labour Party 
has been my family; most of my friends are in it’ (Metro, 2009). He is hardly the only 
long-standing member of a party whose partisan affiliation matters for this reason. 
Conscious of the friendship and indeed family-like relationships that engaging 
in a party can engender, several scholars have gone so far as to suggest that partisanship 
as such is a form of ‘political friendship’ (Muirhead, 2014; Ypi, 2016). In this view, 
partisanship, which is institutionally stabilised by membership in a party, is an 
‘associative relation established when the interest in such projects is shared with other 
people who (like friends) support each other in their pursuit’ (Ypi, 2016: 605). For our 
purposes, the important point to take from these theoretical arguments is that party 
members’ ‘awareness of the worthiness of one’s political commitment … draws … 
confirmation from the day to day engagement with concrete others who contribute to 
that shared project with their knowledge and efforts’ (ibid.). And with this ‘day to day 
engagement with concrete others’ comes the establishment of close personal 
relationships that become valuable through, and eventually independent of, the shared 
commitment to particular political goals that initially brought the relevant individuals 
together. 
                                                 
5 We thank one anonymous reviewer for pressing us to clarify this issue. Note that this point also holds 
true also for the argument we develop in the next sub-section. 
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  Once again, our arguments about the significance of partisan affiliation for 
one’s self-esteem and social relationships must be qualified. While partisan 
commitments may have such significance for many, not all members may relate to their 
party in the same way. Consider, for instance, relatively new members, or those 
members whose engagement with their party has been intermittent rather than 
sustained. For such individuals, partisan commitments are less likely to be connected 
to their sense of self or their social lives in ways that could render exit from the party 
unduly burdensome. As such, parties may be justified in offering greater protection 
against disciplinary sanctions to those who have been party members for a specified 
period of time or have demonstrated a given level of engagement with the party. 
To sum up: the exit-rights argument cannot conclusively settle claims for the 
exercise of free speech within political parties. At least for those party members who 
exhibit deep commitment to the party, exit-rights arguments seem insufficient in order 
to justify restrictions to limits of speech. But it is difficult to see how one could advance 
a more generalised argument. In many (perhaps most) cases, whether exit is costly 
depends on specific individual circumstances, for instance to do with the depth of an 
individual’s commitment to a given political party, or the thickness of her relationships 
with other party members. And there are also many cases where our judgment about 
the costs of taking the exit route depends on systemic factors, like whether meaningful 
alternative parties are available to individuals. What is certain is that party members, 
like employees, at least in some situations cannot simply withdraw from their 
organisation without bearing significant burdens. But again, we cannot plausibly draw 
the strong conclusion that parties may never permissibly constrain their members’ 




The competitiveness argument 
  
Consider yet another argument for restricting party members’ freedom of speech. This 
holds that electoral success is a non-negotiable objective that any political party must 
pursue, and so any conduct that undermines parties’ ability to pursue this objective – 
such as dissent by party members – may permissibly be restricted. 
An initial objection to this argument might be that, apart from electoral success, 
partisans have a compelling interest in the advancement of shared ends: the 
propagation of collective ideas and persuading others of their validity. In this respect, 
parties are less like firms and more like members of a religious denomination. The 
realisation of shared ends presupposes discipline within the party, and the exercise of 
free speech by some might jeopardise this collective good for others. But note that the 
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notion of ‘shared ends’ presupposes a degree of inclusive deliberation, however 
unfinished or episodic, over the proper aims and purposes of a party. And this means 
that, without sufficient safeguards for members’ speech, we could not rely on the 
party’s discursive processes to point towards ends that could be taken as shared. 
Now, how exactly might freedom of speech within parties pose a problem to 
their pursuit of electoral success? First, if party members are able to freely voice 
whatever criticism they have of the party’s general direction, this might mean that 
‘intra-party dissension flares all the time, unsuppressed’ (Rosenblum, 2008: 361), 
making it very difficult for the party to agree on a shared platform. The typical result 
of this, programmatic vagueness ‘is clearly costly to political parties’ (note that this is 
categorically different from deliberate and strategic position-blurring, which can in fact 
be advantageous to parties, see Rovny, 2014: 272). Unable to communicate where they 
stand in terms of policy, voters are likely to desert them. Second, free speech in the 
form of individual members vocally criticising the party leadership might send to 
voters the potentially costly signal that the party leadership has ‘lost control’ over the 
party, casting doubts on their credentials as leaders more generally. This, too, can be 
electorally costly. 
What must be borne in mind is that ‘electoral success’ might mean very 
different things for different parties, and how much dissent a party can admit may 
depend much on its understanding of electoral success. Clearly, electoral systems 
create an important enabling and constraining environment here. In FPTP systems, 
electoral success typically means winning elections and, by extension, office. Because 
of that, one might be inclined to say that parties under FPTP can accommodate less 
internal disagreement. To win, they simply need to minimise contingencies and speak 
with one voice. Historically, this is reflected in high levels of party discipline and 
centralised leadership (Kam, 2009; Rosenbluth and Shapiro, 2018). 
In PR systems, by contrast, electoral success can mean a range of different 
things, from being able to form new coalitions, to further empowering the opposition, 
to increasing the total number of votes of one’s ideological ‘bloc’, as in the 
Scandinavian parliaments (Green-Pedersen and Thomsen, 2005). There is a broad 
palette of goals parties can set for themselves. Under those circumstances, it seems, 
there is also more space for dissenting opinions within the party, not only because for 
many parties they stakes are less high than under FPTP – it is not always a matter of 
winning or losing – but also because parties have more room to experiment with 
internal democracy and alternative forms of member participation (Wolkenstein, 
forthcoming). They might even develop a distinctive ‘party brand’ around internal 
discussion and bottom-up participation, just as many of the Green parties did when 
they first emerged in Western European party systems. 
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In addition to electoral systems, the territorial organisation of parties is likely 
to affect the extent to which they can accommodate internal disagreement without 
compromising electoral success. In federal states like Germany, parties form 
‘territorially integrated organisations which are internally subdivided along the federal 
polity’ (Benz, 2003: 34-35). And although the regional party organisations tend to 
generally support the national party’s values and goals, they ‘still have room to 
maneuver because of their own legitimation through regional elections’ (Hadley et al., 
1989: 95). This means that regional party organisations may well freely voice their 
disagreement with the national party line and – depending on the size of the region and 
the electoral support they enjoy – even exercise pressure on the national party. There 
is little reason to think this must be detrimental for the party’s overall electoral success, 
however. Indeed, if the relative electoral stability of many of the established parties in 
the above-named countries is any indication, there is no necessary connection between 
federal organisation and the level of disagreement it brings with it, and a party’s 
electoral fortunes. 
These considerations certainly provide no knock-down argument against the 
proposition that parties may permissibly constrain their members’ freedom of speech 
in order to ensure that they retain electoral competitiveness. But they chip away at the 
underlying premise that allowing freedom of speech within parties necessarily makes 
it harder to succeed in the electoral arena. The next thing we want to question is whether 
electoral success is always and necessarily the most important goal parties pursue. 
Remember that there are many political systems where (mainstream) parties 
have formed ‘cartels’ in order to limit competition. Party scholars have suggested that, 
in those systems, the interests of the cartelising parties lie as much in winning elections 
as ‘in having the possible costs of losing reduced as much as possible. After all, always 
winning is unlikely’ (Katz and Mair, 2009: 756). In practice, this mainly involves that 
the parties in question secure greater access to public funds; ensure that their members 
obtain important positions in the bureaucracy; and distribute more and more policy 
responsibilities to unelected bodies that are somewhat aligned with their political 
objectives (think of central banks, constitutional courts, etc.) (see Hopkin and Blyth, 
2019). Thus, for parties that cooperate in cartels, electoral success might indeed not be 
the single most important goal. They might invest just as much efforts and energies 
into upholding their system of mutual cooperation with other parties and the state more 
generally. This considerably reduces the force of the argument that parties may 
permissibly limit their members’ freedom of speech in order to remain electorally 
competitive. 
Besides the more specific case of cartel parties, there is a real question whether 
electoral success should be seen as always having priority over other aims pursued by 
parties. By this, we mean that it may well be that there are certain periods, most 
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obviously election campaigns, where electoral success is of primary importance. 
During such periods, and all else equal, parties may be said to have a stronger claim to 
impose sharper restrictions on their members’ speech so as to ensure a coherent 
message for voters. An analogy from law may help clarify what we mean here. In many 
jurisdictions, election law recognises the distinctive status of campaign periods, 
carving out exceptions that would not apply under ordinary political moments. For 
instance, parties and candidates are frequently permitted to distributed election 
materials and posters only during specified campaign periods. Such regulations 
recognise the distinctiveness of electoral campaigns and indicate how norms that 
govern such periods should not become routine practice. The question of strict party 
unity in the context of the need for a coherent electoral message could plausibly be 
approached along similar lines. 
That norms that govern campaign periods should not become routine practice 
is crucially important. Otherwise we would reduce parties to mere electoral machines, 
failing to take seriously their broader role as collective agents that channel and 
articulate societal grievances, advance public justifications for their aims and policies, 
and socialise citizens into the political process (on this, see White and Ypi, 2016). 
Indeed, parties’ capacity to serve these other democratically important functions would 
be severely impaired if they always imposed strict speech limits on their members. For 
example, it is hard to see how parties could effectively channel and articulate societal 
grievances if members are sanctioned for criticising the party line for being 
insufficiently attentive to citizens’ most pressing concerns. The cases of Suheyl Batum 
and Gufran-e-Azam, mentioned at the beginning of this article, can help illustrate this 
point. These are concerned senior party members who were critical of their party 
leaders’ performance in their election campaigns, and subsequently urged a post-
mortem of their parties’ campaign strategies and incumbent heads. The timing of their 
criticism meant that they could hardly be said to damage their parties’ electoral 
prospects except if the relevant temporal lines were drawn so widely that the party were 
seen as perpetually in campaign mode.6 
                                                 
6 Political speech is seen by many as deserving heightened protection vis-à-vis the state relative to other 
forms of speech (Barendt, 2005: ch. 5). From this perspective, our willingness to afford greater leeway 
to political parties during election campaigns may seem odd. However, this concession is grounded in 
the recognition that parties are not analogous to the state. Whereas the state should be subject to enhanced 
scrutiny in sanctions it imposes on citizens’ speech in an election campaign, the same is not true of 
parties. Parties, as we acknowledge, are purposive institutions that may – unlike the state – claim 
electoral competitiveness as a factor that bears on disputes concerning their members’ speech. Yet, as 
we argue, recognising this feature of partisan activity does not mean adopting a simplistic view of parties 
as purely electoral machines. Our account acknowledges the force of the argument from competitiveness 
while seeking to narrow its scope in recognition of the multi-faceted nature of political parties. We thank 
an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to clarify this point. 
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 In sum, we think the correct conclusion is that, first, the argument from electoral 
competitiveness has much less weight than might at first appear. Depending on the 
political system within which parties operate, free speech within parties need not be 
costly for them, plus it is hardly the case that winning elections is always or necessarily 
the most important objective parties pursue. Second, insofar as parties seek to limit free 
speech on the grounds of electoral aims, their claim to do so is much stronger during 
election campaigns. Election campaigns are extraordinary periods, and we believe 
there are good reasons to think that this also (pro tanto) permits a more restrictive 






We have argued that preservation of party members’ moral agency constitutes a 
significant interest, and that this interest is best served by the protection of their speech 
vis-a-vis the party. As such, there is a compelling presumptive case in favour of 
freedom of speech within the party. While we have acknowledged that there may be 
circumstances where this case may be overridden, we have tried to argue that it may be 
harder to defeat than one might first think. Although members may seem free to exit 
their respective parties, we have argued that exit from one’s party is not a plausible 
substitute for exercising moral agency within the party. For it may, depending on the 
context, negatively impact one’s exercise of political rights to democratic participation, 
impose costs on an individual’s social status and self-esteem, or carry non-material 
costs attached to the severing of close ties and relationships with co-partisans.  
To be sure, such arguments are not decisive in grounding a universal right 
against sanctions for dissent. However, they warn against conceptualising exit rights 
as a default strategy for the exercise of moral agency, demonstrating why partisans may 
deserve greater protection for internal dissent. Nor is it clear, as we have argued, that 
parties’ interests in electoral success always trumps their members’ interests in the 
exercise of moral agency. In the first instance, depending on the electoral system in 
place, internal dissent may not be so costly for parties. Moreover, there are ways of 
balancing parties’ electoral objectives with their members’ claim to exercising moral 
agency by, for instance, taking a stricter view of dissent during a limited campaign 
period. In sum, to settle how parties should respond to dissent within their ranks, we 
need to take into account a wide range of circumstances, including where a party stands 
in the life cycle of the electoral process at a given moment and the party’s relationship 
with the wider party system. Indeed, there is a multiplicity of normatively relevant 
factors that the on-going debate over parties’ internal affairs should heed, and we hope 
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that this article can contribute to reorienting and expanding the debate by drawing 
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